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Reflecting critically on Turin’s Strategic Planning Experience 
Silvia Saccomani (2011) 
 
Abstract. Strategic planning experiences have been widespread across many European 
countries in the past decades and have been the subject of many articles and essays. In 
Italy these experiences occurred later than in other countries. Actually, the first well-
known strategic planning experience in Italy was developed in Turin at the end of the 
1990s. Thus, Turin could be an interesting case to study, because it can been looked at 
as a paradigmatic case from different points of view, perhaps not only related to the 
Italian situation: the point of view of economic and social changes, the point of view of 
spatial transformations, the point of view of the undertaken policies and also the point 
of view of the innovative government processes that have been developed in the last ten 
years.   
At the end of the last decade this sort of innovative turn seemed to be over; a new cycle 
in the economy as well as in the strategy for looking at the future and in the policies and 
politics that will govern the city and its metropolitan area may be about to start. 
This paper describes the changes that took place and tries to reflect critically on the results of 
the strategic planning process that was developed during the last decade as an answer to these 
changes, underlining especially the weak points of the experience, which could be at the base of 
the current situation too.   
Keywords: Strategic planning; spatial planning; governance; industrial city in transition 
Introduction  
Strategic planning experiences have been widespread across many European countries 
in the past decades and have been the subject of many articles and essays.1 In Italy these 
experiences occurred later than in other countries. There could be different reasons, but 
one can be traced back to the legal planning system, which does not recognise such an 
instrument as a strategic plan, except in some more recent regional planning acts, but 
more generally does not set up the conditions for easily developing governance 
processes, which are more common in other countries. Actually, the first well-known 
strategic planning experience in Italy was developed in Turin at the end of the 1990s; 
other cases followed, and were influenced by this first experience. Hence, Turin could 
be an interesting case to study,2
More generally, Turin can be seen as a paradigmatic case from different points 
of view, in Italy, but probably not only in Italy: the point of view of its structural 
changes – during the last 15–20 years its economic structure, its social structure and 
even its way of life have changed; the point of view of its urban transformations – its 
spatial, physical and functional organisation has been radically changed; the point of 
view of the policies undertaken – policies, more similar to those of other European 
cities, explicitly targeted to compete at an international level in the field of tourism and 
attraction, quite an unusual target for such an industrial city; and finally also the point of 
view of the innovative government processes that have been developed in the last ten 
years, that is, the strategic planning process.  
 as an example demonstrating the way the strategic 
planning process has been conducted in Italy.  
At the end of the last decade this sort of innovative turn seemed to be over: a 
new cycle in the economy, as well as in the strategy for looking at the future and in the 
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policies and politics that will govern the city and its metropolitan area, may be about to 
start. This is another reason that could make it interesting to reflect on this case. 
The objective of this article is to describe the changes that have affected the city and its 
metropolitan area and to reflect critically on the strategic planning process that was 
developed during the last decade as an answer to these changes. The article is organised 
as follows: a brief outline of the history of the city and its situation in the 1990s, in 
order to recall the starting point of the recent experiences, that is, the challenge the city 
had to face, the development and features of the traditional planning process and the 
new experiences through strategic planning, the features of this strategic planning 
process if compared with other experiences and finally some critical remarks about the 
results of this experience underlying especially the weak points of it, which could be at 
the base of the current situation too.  
From a “one-company town” to the decline of a “Fordist” city 
In Italy Turin has been the industrial city par excellence (Gabert, 1964). Its 
development has been based on industry since the second half of the eighteenth century. 
The turning point was the unity of Italy in 1861. Until then Turin had been the capital of 
a small kingdom and its economy was based on this role (state administration, the court, 
the army). In 1865 the capital was moved to Florence and then in 1970 to Rome; Turin 
lost its role, and this meant a serious economic as well as an identity crisis. Some 
authors (Ave, 2005) argue that in this situation Turin tried for the first time to define a 
strategy for its future, and this future had to be industry. From the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century until the 1970s, the economic development of the city and of its 
metropolitan area (MA) was linked to industrial development and especially to the car 
industry, that is, to Fiat, one of the biggest Italian companies. Especially during the 
1950s and the 1960s, but also previously, most of the industrial plants in Turin and its 
area were dependent on mechanic and automotive construction. This resulted in an 
increasing specialisation of the area and in one of the greatest industrial concentrations 
in Europe: Turin was referred to as “the Italian Detroit”, a system oriented toward the 
mass production of standardised goods, based on great industrial concentration: in short 
a “Fordist” model. The economic structure of the town, even the way life was organised 
within it, and the local authority action too were strongly dependent on the will and 
destiny of the leading company; from the Second World War until the 1980s Turin was 
considered a “one-company town” (Bagnasco, 1986, 1988, 1990). 
The high demand for workforce attracted a lot of immigrants, especially from the 
southern part of Italy. The population grew first in Turin, then in the municipalities of the MA, 
following the overspill of factories or the search for lower-priced houses.3 The growth of the 
leader industry, the growth of the population owing to immigration and the sprawl of industry 
and inhabitants from the core city to the rest of the MA formed the urban development model 
until the 1970s. The consequence was a polarised development pattern in Piedmont Region,4
This development model meant a lot of social problems, due also to a lack of 
social housing: in Italy the public housing policy has never been able to cope with the 
demand (Governa and Saccomani, 2009). 
 the 
region in which Turin is located. 
Things changed in the 1970s, when, after the oil crisis of 1973, the limits of this 
economic development model based more or less only on the car industry became clear. 
During the 1970s, Fiat changed a great deal: financial reorganisation, new labour-saving 
technologies and the relocation of part of its production plants out of Turin and out of 
Italy. This resulted during the 1980s in a loss of jobs in Turin in the large companies, an 
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increase in small and medium companies and also an increase in the number of them 
(high-tech or science-based sectors); once dependent on Fiat, they became more 
autonomous and began to find new markets abroad too, owing to their acquired know-
how (Dematteis and Segre, 1988). Since the 1980s Turin can no longer be considered a 
“one-company town”, even if Fiat maintains its dominant role. 
The demographic trend has also changed: in the mid-1970s Turin began to lose 
its population,5
The physical evidence of the economic changes was the increase in the number 
and dimensions of brown fields, many of which were located along the railway system, 
not very far from the centre of the city. The word “de-industrialisation” was brought 
into the debate along with a feeling that the future of Turin would no longer be 
industrial, but that it would become a service city. This was the background of the new 
Piano regolatore generale (Comprehensive Master Plan) that was prepared at the end of 
the 1980s, adopted in 1993, just when a new centre-left coalition was elected in the city 
council, and finally approved by the regional government in 1995. When the plan was 
approved the economic situation had already changed.  
 owing to a very low birth rate, the end of the immigration flows from 
the rest of Italy and the moving of many families to the outskirts (in search of lower flat 
rents and a better environmental situation). This demographic process has changed the 
MA from a basically monocentric one to a more polycentric one. 
At the beginning of the 1990s a serious economic crisis took place in Italy and it 
was probably most serious in Piedmont and in Turin; the peak was reached in 1993 and 
it led to a downsizing of industrial activities. In the early 1990s the city viewed itself, 
and was viewed from the outside, as a town in steep industrial decline and the dominant 
feeling was one of pessimism regarding the future: the Fordist model was over and a 
decline in employment in the leading industry was occurring. In 1990 Arnaldo 
Bagnasco wrote that we knew that we were “after Ford”, but we did not know yet 
clearly where the transition was going to bring us. 
The challenge: towards a new strategy  
The crisis in the leading company went on at least until 2005,6
In short, in spite of the crisis and the changes, at the end of the 1990s Turin was 
still an industrial city with a great challenge in front of it: to invent a new economic 
future, in the new contest of globalisation and competition within Europe, and, despite 
major job losses, this future still had to be linked to the skills and to the social and 
cultural milieu that the industrial history had grounded in the city and its area, even if 
this did not mean returning to the industrial productions the city economy had been 
developing for a long time (Emanuel and Governa, 1997). 
 but starting in the second 
half of the 1990s the economic situation began to ameliorate and this trend lasted, 
between light and shadows, until 2007, when the recent international crisis began. In 
spite of the Fiat crisis, there was evidence that Turin’s economy was still linked to the 
car and car components industries, but also that Turin’s automotive industries were 
becoming much more fully integrated into global automotive supply (Whitford and 
Enrietti, 2005), that developments in other important industrial sectors (such as 
industrial automation, components, aeronautical parts, information technology and 
satellite systems) were taking place and that there was also an increase in the number of 
jobs generated in innovative segments of the service sector (banking and insurance, 
design and publishing), even if not at the same rate and with the same features as in 
other Italian cities, like, for instance, Milan.  
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This task of inventing a new future had to be undertaken in a new social 
situation, in which the population decline was continuing, even if at a lower rate, with a 
strong growth of elderly people, while there was an increase in immigration from non-
EU countries.7
The answer to the challenge 
 The new immigration was and is still another important issue that would 
change a lot in the local labour market and in the social situation.  
Before describing the answer the city provided to this challenge it is useful to recall the 
tools it had, at least from the point view of planning. One of these was the new Master 
Plan approved in 1995. 
The Comprehensive Master Plan (MP) 
As stated before, the scenario the plan foresaw was one of a radical change in the 
economic structure of Turin: no longer an industrial town, development based on the 
service sector and intensive as well as symbolic reuse of the huge amount of brown 
fields. 
In short, it is a plan based on a great offer for the property market (a large supply 
of spaces for offices, service activities and residences), in order to attract investors 
owing to the quality of a new urban design in the redevelopment areas. These areas 
were mostly the abandoned industrial areas: the post-industrial city was going to heal its 
wounds. This policy had common elements with those of other European cities that 
were experiencing or had previously experienced de-industrialisation processes. 
The plan proposes a spatial reorganisation around three axes: the leisure axis 
along the river Po, a private service activities axis (Marche Avenue at the western 
boundary) and the so-called spina centrale (central backbone), the most important axis. 
The last one takes advantage of an important infrastructure project for the reorganisation 
of the regional and metropolitan railway system, decided at the beginning of the 1980s, 
the so-called passante ferroviario (railway link), owing to which tracks will be 
underground and covered and new stations built or enhanced along them. The biggest 
industrial vacant areas were mostly located along this infrastructure. The spina centrale 
is a sort of north–south axis with a wide lane built over the covered tracks, divided into 
four large redevelopment zones located near the stations. Their urban design is quite 
unusual for Turin: high densities among great open spaces. Other important 
redevelopments are located along the passante ferroviario from Porta Nuova station 
(the old central station) to Lingotto, one of the abandoned Fiat plants, which was closed 
at the beginning of the 1980s.8
The real engine of the redevelopment foreseen by the plan has been the spina 
centrale. Actually, at the beginning the implementation of the plan proved not to be so 
easy and the city administration had to change some of its rules by means of a large 
amount of varianti (changes) to it: some of the plan rules made it difficult for 
developers to take advantage of it in a weak building and real estate market (Saccomani, 
2001), which lasted until late 1990s. Then state funds for regeneration programmes, for 
the Olympic Games programme and finally a newly hot real estate market pushed 
forward the plan implementation, which is now nearly complete.
 Other smaller redevelopment zones are located in the 
rest of the territory on industrial areas, especially in the periphery (Figure 1): some were 
already vacant; some were still in use, but the plan considered them vacant. The spatial 
reorganisation of the city is completed by a metro line. 
9 In the last three years 
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the economic crisis has struck and the real estate market entered an oversupply phase, 




Figure 1 - Turin Master Plan: redevelopment zones 
 
The Strategic Plans 
The Master Plan was not the best tool for answering the challenge I mentioned before. 
Turin was in search of a new development model and of a new identity – in the fields of 
research, innovation and so on; the urban policy of the plan, which was in fact nothing 
other than a real estate development policy, was not enough to fulfil the task of 
inventing a new future for the city. In 1998 a new planning action started: the strategic 
planning process. 
This decision was also fostered by an institutional change: since 1993 mayors in 
the big Italian cities have been elected directly. This reform gives the elected mayors a 
greater leadership role, more visibility and more freedom from the power of political 
parties, with local politics becoming more personalised. The mayor elected in 1993 was 
not a politician, but a professor at Politecnico, and his election was supported not only 
by a political coalition (centre-left), but also by a sort of mobilisation of the civil society 
(Pinson, 2003, 2009). This formed the basis for what was called the “forum for 
development”, which included about 30 public and private actors representing the 
cultural, economic and social forces of the city. 
Given the growing importance of internationalisation, the forum for 
development put forward a project to promote the international position of Turin and 
brought about the Strategic Plan (SP), the title of which is in fact “Strategic Plan for the 
International Promotion of Turin” (TorinoInternazionale, 2000). The mayor and the city 
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council approved the project; the mayor was the leader, but the plan was not made by 
the city administration.11
The plan was carried out quickly, in 18 months, and during its preparation Turin 
was assigned the Winter Olympic Games of 2006, which was seen as a powerful driver 
for the plan itself and integrated into it. Actually, the plan’s strategic lines (Table 1) 
include sport, tourism and culture as important factors for the vision of the future city. 
This is quite an innovative goal for such an old industrial city, which was seen as a grey, 
foggy city and had never attracted tourists, even if it owns an interesting architectural 
heritage, being one of the most significant baroque cities in Europe, and has a fine 
landscape owing to its position between the Alps and the hills along the river Po. 
 
 
Table 1 – The first Strategic Plan: goals, vision, strategic lines    
The goal: a new international identity for the city in order to compete in the globalised world 
The vision:  - Turin as a European metropolis; 
                    - Turin, an ingenious city, which gets things done and does them right; 
                    - Turin that knows how to choose: the intelligence of the future and the 
                      quality of life  
  The strategic lines:  
- line 1: to integrate the metropolitan area into the international system 
- line 2: to construct the metropolitan government in order to coordinate and optimise  
  projects and services 
- line 3: to develop training and research as strategic resources 
- line 4: to promote enterprise and employment 
- line 5: to promote Turin as a city of culture, tourism, commerce and sports  
- line 6: to improve urban quality  
Source: TorinoInternazionale (2000)  
 
The final document was an agreement for the future of the city by 2010, signed 
by 57 public and private partners, among whom were also the mayors of 22 
municipalities around Turin (not all the municipalities of the MA12 because the process 
was a voluntary one). In May 2000 a public–private agency, Torino Internazionale, was 
formed with the task of implementing the plan.13
The first Strategic Plan (SP) vision was a better position of the city and the 
metropolitan area in the European and international arena.
   
14 The plan recognised that a 
process of change was already taking place in the city and wanted to direct it. The 6 
strategic lines included 20 objectives and 84 projects, many of which concerned 
economic transformations and some physical transformations too. The latter were 
projects already in progress foreseen by the Master Plan or by other programmes.15
The first SP was an important step in the political and administrative life of the 
city and helped move away from the pessimism of the early 1990s to a new vision of the 
future of the city, at least among the city elites. A similar effect was provided by the 
Olympic Games concerning the population. The reaction of the city population to this 
event was surprising and perhaps a pride and hope reaction: pride because the city had 
been able to organise it and hope for a real change in the future of the city. However, 
this effect was rather transitory. 
 
Five years later the revision of the first SP started; the new plan was presented in 
July 2006. Why was there a new plan after only five years when the previous one had to 
last until 2010? The reason the first document put forward was that the transformation 
process of Turin was going on and it was necessary to be more selective in defining the 
priorities on which to concentrate investments. 
As a matter of fact, the vision changed. If the first plan’s vision was to build a 
new international identity for the city, the second one’s was to foster knowledge-based 
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development involving not just the traditional élite, but increasingly large segments of a 
responsible and active society. The new vision is based on the following ideas: the 
development model of the more advanced economies is based on knowledge, a 
knowledge-based economy and society does not mean only services and the production 
of immaterial goods, but also innovation and research in the production processes of 
material goods, and Turin owns all the assets necessary for this kind of development 
model; it is not necessary to give up its industrial past, because the milieu it has 
grounded can evolve rapidly towards a research and knowledge economy. Besides, it is 
necessary to pay special attention to the already-existing human capital. This kind of 
development also needs greater attention to be directed towards the metropolitan 
dimension of government, to the social cohesion issues and to economic strategies and 
their territorial dimension (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 – The second Strategic Plan 
The vision: a development process based on knowledge 
 Four thematic areas: 
− the metropolitan territory 
−  the social quality 
−  the cultural potential 
−  the economic development 
− Twelve strategic directions: 
− education 
− creativity 
−  industrial transformation 
−  jobs 
− health and care 
− urban and territorial transformations 
− accessibility, transports and mobility 
− logistic 
− urban regeneration and housing 
− cultural resources  
− city image promotion and tourism 
− immigration 
Source: TorinoInternazionale (2006) 
 
Some elements can be underlined in this change of strategy. In the second SP 
there is a greater stress on the metropolitan dimension and on a multi-level form of 
governance; the metropolitan area is seen as the right level both for governance and for 
government, even if as far as the government is concerned no institutional solution is 
proposed. There is greater attention to the spatial dimension of the strategies: for 
instance, some of the issues are a more polycentric city, urban design quality, the 
relationship between big projects to be selected and the transport and mobility system. 
There is greater attention to social cohesion issues: problems such as health, youth, 
education and jobs, immigration, housing and urban regeneration. There is a clearer 
focus on the strategies for economic development: Turin cannot renounce its industrial 
tradition, but it has to select those forms of productions and services with a higher 
knowledge and research content (the focus is on automotive, ICT and aerospace 
sectors). The new development conditions, necessary for competing in a globalised 
world, are seen also to be the base for a new way to make Turin an attractive city, even 
if tourism, culture and finally the great events policy are part of the strategy.16  
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Actually, the presence of tourists increased, undoubtedly because of the 
visibility obtained with the Olympic Games. However, this effect was maintained over 
time thanks to intensive work on the recovery and promotion of cultural heritage in the 
city and its surroundings. In the early 2000s, in fact, even in the wake of the Strategic 
Plan, the renovation of museums and the recovery of cultural heritage were significant, 
supported by a strong increase in expenditure by local authorities as well as banking 
foundations. It should be noted that, unlike many measures taken under the Master Plan 
in the rest of the city, this renovation of museums and, above all, the redevelopment of 
public spaces in the historic centre (the museum district) in particular is of good quality 
and really modified the usability of this district. Other important projects were carried 
out on historic buildings in the municipalities of the metropolitan area.17
What has happened since 2006 
 The 
programming of a new innovative cultural offering has been quite active, supported by a 
new interest in contemporary cultural consumption, and helped to spread an image of 
Turin as a city of culture. The increase in spending, however, has been greatly reduced 
since 2006 (ComitatoGiorgioRota and L’EauVive, 2009). 
In the last ten years the socio-economic situation of Turin and its region has certainly 
changed a lot, but the changes have been contradictory. Until 2007 some signals of an 
improving situation emerged. At the beginning of the recent crisis it was possible to 
observe that, following the changes in the sector composition of employment, there had 
been an increase in jobs in the service sector, no longer driven by the externalisation 
from the industry, but that in Turin the amount of industrial occupation was, and still is, 
greater than that in other big Italian urban areas. Other indicators show that the 
conditions for a knowledge-based society (such as educated people, research centres, 
etc.) are growing more slowly than in other areas, including Italian ones. It can be added 
that starting in 2005 Fiat seemed to be recovering after a period in which it seemed to be 
running towards failure. Then it started a new international strategy by a joint venture 
with the American Chrysler; this new strategy is now going to resize Fiat’s presence in 
Italy in general and in Turin in particular. There is a risk that the most important 
functions of the Fiat Group (especially those linked with direction and innovative 
projects) could be moved elsewhere and resized. This would have a serious impact on 
an economy that is still linked to the automotive sector (components production, 
technology and design). 
Besides, in the last three years, the global economic crisis has been hitting the 
economic situation in Piedmont and Turin strongly, with an increasing loss of jobs. It 
can be said that the recent crisis started just when Turin’s economic changes were 
underway but still in mid-stream (Staricco, 2010). There are doubts that the changes that 
took place are sufficient to ensure a new future for Turin in the field of the knowledge-
based economy (Cominu, 2011).  
From the point of view of the strategic planning process we can observe that the 
process stopped or at least changed in its essential features. In fact, the second plan has 
never been formally approved by anyone. The Torino Internazionale Agency remained 
an independent agency, but was progressively more linked to the central city 
administration, formally in charge of implementing and monitoring the Strategic Plans 
projects, but, as a matter of fact, in the last years its task has been merely carrying out 
research and promoting some information or participation events. Recently it also 
created a new Association – Torino Nord Ovest – that develops studies, consultancy and 
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evaluation activities in the socio-economic field as far as the North-West Italian region 
is concerned (http://www.Torinonordovest.it/). 
From the point of view of urban planning, in 2008 the city administration 
produced a new document, “Indirizzi di politica urbanistica” (Urban Policy Addresses), 
which should have been the starting point for a general revision of the Master Plan, and 
which was presented and discussed via a forum online, but then nothing happened. This 
document confirmed the three-axis reorganisation of the city (Marche Avenue, spina 
centrale and river Po axes) established by the MP, whose implementation is in progress, 
adding new projects included in the second SP and a new strategic redevelopment area. 
The first ones are linked with the high-speed Lyon–Turin train line. Turin is located 
along European corridor 5 (Lisbon–Kiev), which includes railway infrastructures among 
which are the Turin–Milan line, which is already built, and the Lyon–Turin line. The 
last one was included in the SP, which considers it a strategic project not only for the 
city and its MA, but also for the region and Italy as a whole. The project is partly funded 
by the EU and encompasses a tunnel 57 km long under the Alps. Until 2005 no one 
discussed this project with the inhabitants of Susa Valley, which the line will cross, 
even though, of course, they will be strongly affected by a building site that will last 
many years, without gaining any significant advantage from the new line. There were 
riots in the valley and in 2007 a participation action was established in order to find a 
solution, which has not yet been totally defined. In the MA the project concerning the 
new line affects the already-existing Marche Avenue project and contemplates three 
different levels of lines: an underground railway line for trains to the goods station and 
to the passenger station, an underground road that will connect two points of the 
existing motorway ring road, which is currently very congested, and an avenue at the 
ground level for the local traffic. Along this avenue new important urban developments 
are expected (a sort of new urban centre, a new hospital and medical research centre and 
a museum). At the end of the new Marche Avenue another redevelopment project, 
included in the second Strategic Plan, is foreseen concerning the biggest Fiat plant 
(Mirafiori), which today has only about 5000 workers, and hence a great part of its area 
is vacant. A public–private partnership was formed, involving Fiat and the city 
administration too, in charge of redeveloping this area with the aim of establishing a 
high-tech production and education pole (including a new Politecnico Campus). The last 
project to be launched is the so-called Variante 200 and Metro line 2. It is a variante 
(change) to the Master Plan in the north-east part of the city and it encompasses the new 
metro line and a huge redevelopment of an old goods station, involving public and 
private funds. The idea is to form a public–private company involving the developers 
with the aim of drawing from the redevelopment funds for building partly the new 
metro line. Recently the city administration launched a sort of competition for project 
ideas. 
Conclusions 
From this outline Turin emerges as a city in search of a new identity, which tried to 
develop competitive strategies in order to achieve a new position within the 
international scenario, also by means of promoting tourism under the visibility effect of 
the Olympic Games. It did so using a new planning methodology – strategic planning – 
which was quite innovative in Italy at the end of the 1990s, even though it was already 
in use in other countries. In Italy this experience has been evaluated as a successful one 
and Turin has been viewed as a place of urban innovation (Dente et al., 2005), but not 
only in Italy (Falk, 2003; Winkler, 2007). Of course, some achievements are 
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undeniable. However, as the innovative turn seems to be over and a new cycle in the 
economic and political life of the city seems to be about to start, it is more interesting to 
point out and discuss some points that, in my opinion, are weak points and are perhaps 
at the origin of the present situation. 
The first one is the change that occurred between the first and the second 
strategic planning process. According to Patsy Healey (2010, p. 442), the central 
dimension of a strategic planning process is “… whether, why and how to mobilise 
attention to an urban complex, understood as a whole …”, that is, the momentum that 
leads to explicit strategy-making work.18
In the case of the two Turin Strategic Plans the momentum changed a lot. The 
first plan arose from the urgency to mobilise resources around a shared vision of the 
future for an area in deep decline; the strategic key issues were related to this urgency 
and the involved actors were the key actors.
 
19
The second point concerns the actors involved in the process. In Turin the 
strategic plan-making process involved the key actors, but it was not able to 
communicate with the general population and to incorporate the differences and the 
different demands coming from it. This is an important issue, which is more general 
than the specific case. Is there a contradiction between a strategic approach and the need 
for an inclusive process? Defining strategies means being selective, identifying 
priorities and making decisions; inclusion means consensus, participation, etc., and is 
generally a long and costly process. The risk is that in the end the stakeholders who are 
really involved are the economic key actors, the strong agents, the elites. It is not 
unusual that cities in strong transition, which try to enter the international competitive 
scenario, bet on the élites’ cohesion, in order to present themselves as a whole; this 
happened in the case of Turin, but in the long run this risks the occurrence of conflicts 
and social demands (Pinson, 2009). From this point of view it can be added that, just 
during the first strategic planning process, Turin was experiencing an innovative way of 
tackling social problems by means of the so-called Progetto Speciale Periferie (PSP, 
Special Project for Peripheries), a project decided in 1997 by the city administration and 
which promoted urban regeneration programmes encouraging inhabitants’ participation 
(Governa and Saccomani, 2004; Governa et al., 2009). In Italy PSP ranked as a major 
innovation in planning policies, and as the forerunner of other similar initiatives. 
However, in spite of the fact that line six of the first SP referred to it, there has always 
been a gap just inside the municipal administration between this experience and the 
strategy-making process. The increasing importance, and the rhetoric, of the issues of 
competitiveness, international visibility and so on in practice has deepened the gap with 
the issues linked with social cohesion (Governa and Rossignolo, 2010), in spite of the 
greater rhetoric reference to them in the second plan. It can be added that starting in the 
second half of the last decade the PSP experience has been gradually downsized in its 
goals and practices. 
 In the second case there was not such 
urgency, part of the previous strategy was being implemented (notably the preparation 
for the Olympic Games) and some actors in charge of the plan implementation (notably 
the Torino Internazionale Agency) were in place and ready to play a role in the strategy-
making process, but, possibly just owing to these reasons, the process went on in a sort 
of automatic way, and then it slowly faded away until the present situation. The 
experience was to some extent a real attempt to establish a governance process, at least 
as far as the identification and involvement of important stakeholders and the creation 
of an arena for discussion are concerned, but if this can be considered a real 
achievement of the process, in the end it proved to be an unstable one.  
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In the case of the second plan the mobilisation of actors, even the key actors, 
was weaker, despite the attempts made by Torino Internazionale to involve other actors, 
including NGO ones. According to Bruno Dente (Dente and Melloni, 2005), a strategic 
planning process can have a double function: to increase the relations among different 
actors as an instrument to define and implement shared projects, and to implement 
shared projects as an instrument to increase the whole cooperation ability by means of 
the established relations. The latter should have long-lasting effects because it affects 
the local governance. In the case of Turin’s experience this effect did not become solid 
over time. Six years after the second Strategic Plan the experience seems to be over, and 
the image of cohesion seems to have been replaced by a form of “flattened unanimity” 
(Bobbio, 2009), which does not seem to be sufficiently aware of the still unsolved 
social, economic and urban problems, some of which are becoming more serious owing 
to the recent international crisis. The season of the attempts to form a different 
relationship between government and governance is over and this points out difficulties 
that were not solved.  
The third point concerns just this matter, that is the dualism between Torino 
Internazionale and the administration body of the city 
Patsy Healey (2007, p. 184) states: "To have long-lasting effects, strategies need 
to move from the stage of frame constructions or discourse structuration, to discourse 
institutionalisation …; that is, to the routine practices." This asks for continuity between 
the strategy and related projects’ elaboration and their implementation and management: 
“... the process must involve managing, as well as planning strategically” (Albrecht, 
2006, p. 1165). As a matter of fact, in Turin the implementation of the Strategic Plan 
has established a sort of dualism: Torino Internationale had difficulties in developing its 
role of coordination in the policies’ implementation, because in practice this took place 
through the administrative bodies, while the strategies were not captured in the 
administrative routines of those same structures. In the second plan’s experience these 
difficulties increased: in a phase in which it was necessary to go deep into the strategic 
directions and objectives, the agency’s role became less and less clear and sharp and 
less able to play a coordination role or even a role of accompaniment of the strategy-
deepening process, while Turin’s administrators, meaning both the politicians and the 
technicians, acted in an independent way. Gradually the role of the agency was reduced 
to the present one of an organizer of conferences and workshops. In short, in my 
opinion, over time the only voluntary associations lose their ability to pursue policy 
objectives because they lack power and operational capabilities, which, in the end, 
belong to institutional bodies, especially when a strategic plan deals with a metropolitan 
region.    
This raises the fourth important point to be discussed, the relations between the 
government institutions scale and the plan scale. Both Strategic Plans underline the 
importance of the metropolitan dimension of their strategies. The more the strategy 
takes into account the metropolitan dimension, the more it is necessary to strengthen the 
multi-level governance network, which has always been far from being accomplished in 
the case of Turin, but it is also necessary to recognise the institutional dimension of the 
metropolitan government. From this point of view one of the failures of the strategic 
planning process, perhaps one of the most important, was the missed implementation of 
some forms of metropolitan government (Pinson and Santangelo, 2007). Of course, this 
issue is also linked to the Italian institutional system and its implementation, which 
foresees a metropolitan government institution that has never been established.20 After 
the first Strategic Plan there was an attempt to establish a metropolitan conference 
including 37 municipalities as a way to cross the institutional gap, but this initiative 
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failed. The second plan dealt much more with the necessity to change the action scale, 
from the town to the urban region, but the results were only a few forms of cooperation 
in the field of some public facilities. This also shows the persistent difficulty of dialogue 
between the central city and the outskirt municipalities. Actually, many of them were 
able to establish cooperation processes through different “territorial pacts” dealing with 
the economic development of their territories (Corrado, 2007), but these pacts generally 
did not include Turin. 
The fifth point concerns another  important issue, the integration between the 
spatial dimension and the socio-economic one in the strategic planning experience of 
Turin, i.e. the relationship between the strategic plans and the traditional urban 
planning. As stated before, strategic planning was and still is not a legal requirement in 
Italy.21
The case of Turin is generally appreciated (Bobbio and Gastaldi, 2003) because, having 
a recent Master Plan that was being implemented, the few projects that in the first SP 
had a physical definition obviously referred to it, linking the two planning instruments. 
However, apart from them, the strategic lines and objectives lack a spatial dimension.  
 All the strategic planning experiences that were developed in Italy following 
that of Turin tried to establish a relation between planning regulations and strategic 
plans in different ways, according to the stage of urban planning (existing, old or new, 
or in-progress Master Plans) (Sartorio, 2005). However, generally they have a certain 
weakness as far as the spatial dimension of the strategic choices is concerned. They are 
predominantly “policy documents” that sometimes occur alongside traditional urban 
and territorial plans. 
Spatial strategies focus attention on the “where” of activities and values, on the 
qualities and meaning of places, on the flows that connect one place to another 
and on the spatial dimensions of the way activities are organised ... what gives 
spatial strategy its distinctive focus and contribution is the recognition that 
“geography matters” (Healey, 2007, p. 201). 
In other European experiences of metropolitan or regional strategic planning 
spatial schemes exist. I do not mean that in these cases the result of the process is a 
“plan-as-a-map”, like the old structure plans, but that the strategy is grounded on “the 
where”. In Turin’s first SP, but also in most of the other Italian experiences, spatial 
schemes are lacking (Sartorio, cit.). In the second SP some attempts at greater 
integration between the strategic vision and the varianti of the Master Plan were made, 
but significantly these concern only the central city Master Plan and not the rest of the 
MA, where the other municipalities were and are taking spatial decisions by means of 
their MPs. Again the traditional planning elaborations are put side by side with the 
strategic vision without real and complete integration. It is significant too that the new 
urban planning document of the city, discussed in 2008, and the new important spatial 
projects I mentioned before, even if included in the SP, are not being discussed within 
the same arena that had been established during the strategic planning experience. What 
I want to underline is not the lack of a map, but the fact that the strategy seems not to be 
strongly grounded in the knowledge of what the metropolitan region is concerned with 
from the point of view of its spatial features, the qualities of places, etc. It is not a 
question of a missed collection of data, but of the way the knowledge of the urban 
region entered the strategy-making process. This can be linked to the kind of actors who 
were involved in the process (stakeholders, elites, more than technical bodies), to the 
specific Italian planning system, which does not generally include such experiences, 






1. Among them for instance: Gibelli (1996); Healey (1997); Pinson (2002); Healey (2004); Dente et al. 
(2005); Healey (2006a); Healey (2006b); Pinson and Santangelo (2007); Healey (2010). 
2. Just because it has been the first one Turin’s strategic planning experience has been analysed by many 
authors, especially in Italy; see for instance: Falk (2003); Pinson (2003); Rosso (2004); Ave (2005); 
Sartorio (2005); Albrecht (2006); Pinson and Santangelo (2007); Winkler (2007); Pinson (2009); 
Saccomani (2010); Colantonio and Dixon (2011). 
3. In 20 years, between 1951 and 1971, Turin’s population doubled with about 50,000 more 
inhabitants each year. 
4. In 1971 48% of the employment and 42% of the population of Piedmont Region was located in Turin 
MA. At the beginning of the 1970s the employment in Fiat’s plants in the TMA added up to about 
120,000 jobs. 
5. Turin’s population was decreasing until 2002, from 1,167,968 inhabitants in 1971 (1,802,723 
in the 53 municipalities of the traditional MA), to 860,000 in 2002. Then a slight increase 
started to 908,501 inhabitants at the end of 2010. 
6. Fiat’s local production fell by 56% by 2003, many big plants in the MA were closed and the 
remaining big plant, Mirafiori, which still had 60,000 employees in the 1980s, had about 
25,000 in 2000 and was down to just 11,500 in December 2004. 
7. In 1994 foreign-born residents of Turin accounted for less than 2% of the city’s population, 
while at the end of 2010 the foreigners legally resident in Turin made up 14.2% of the total 
population. These new citizens are at the origin of the small change in the demographic 
trend. 
8. Lingotto is a huge building with a test track on the roof, built in the 1920s and now hosting an 
exhibition centre, congress centre, commercial centre, hotels, university, etc. 
9. In 2007 a local journal took stock of the implementation of the Master Plan; see Various 
Authors (2008). 
10. As a matter of fact, the real estate market in Turin has some specificities. Also during the hot 
period prices remained lower than in other Italian big cities, and now they are not decreasing, 
which is happening elsewhere, but the number of transactions decreased greatly with a 
longer selling time. 
11. The task of developing the project was given to Turismo Torino, an agency created to 
support tourist development, and ITP Investimenti Torino Piemonte, a public/private agency 
created in the mid-1990s with the task of offering opportunities to investors, especially 
foreign investors. 
12. When I refer to Turin MA (TMA) I refer to a legal delimitation of 53 municipalities, 
recognised in 1972 by a regional law, for analytical purposes. Within this area there are 
functional interdependences among the various centres; the spatial configuration is dense and 
compact, due to the constant addition of new productive and residential areas around the 
existing ones and along the main traffic roads (Saccomani, 2007). The city administration of 
Turin has no institutional competence over this area, but the central city does have great 
influence over it. Dialogue between the outskirt municipalities and Turin has always been 
difficult because of the great socio-economic and political influence the central city has had 
over decades. 
13. It included 120 members, leaders throughout the area: mayors, representatives of banking 
foundations, members of public–private agencies, directors of educational institutes and 
research centres, etc., as well as institutions like the Province. The president is the mayor of 
Turin. 
14. The background was the experiences of other European cities, which were able to create a 
sort of “city brand”, above all Barcelona’s experience. Actually the former Barcelona mayor, 
Pasqual Maragal, was called to help the scientific committee in charge of the plan making.  
15. For instance, alongside promotion and cooperation at an international level, the plan 
proposes projects intended to improve the connections with the rest of Europe (metro line, 
airport, passante ferroviario, high-speed railway system). 
16. For instance, in 2008 the Architects World Congress, “Turin world design capital”, 




European Meeting of Euro-Science open forum (Esof); in 2011 celebration events for the 
150 years since the Unity of Italy. 
17. In some of the surrounding municipalities there are palaces built over the centuries by the 
past royal family, which form what is called the “corona di delizie” (crown of delights), 
which are now being restored and  enhanced.  
18  It can be added that during the first process Turin’s mayor was just  the one who had started 
the process, in the second case, the new mayor “inherited” the experience and was probably 
less involved in it. 
19. It could be interesting to underline that Fiat, the leading company that has always been a key 
actor in the city’s political decisions, was not involved in the process. 
20. In 1990 a law introduced a new institution, the Metropolitan City (MC), to be established in 
nine metropolitan areas formed by a central city and other municipalities geographically, 
economically, socially and culturally connected with it: TMA is one of them. The 
Metropolitan City had the functions of planning and programming for the whole area, but the 
law was not implemented and no MC does exist. 
21. Only recently some new regional laws have introduced optional strategic documents at the 
provincial and municipal levels alongside the traditional planning tools and regulations.  
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